Adherence to the ["Innocent Passage"](https://t.me/observer5/1643) Rule

2 Adherence to the Rule: Iran believes that the status of the Strait of Hormuz is governed by customary international law or the older Geneva Convention (1958). Based on this rule, Iran, as the coastal state, has the right to categorically prevent the passage of any hostile ship or submarine if it deems it a threat to its security and peace.

Why hasn't Iran been legally condemned so far?

When Iranian military forces seize violating ships in the Strait of Hormuz or intercept US warships, Washington and its allies cannot condemn Iran in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Security Council for "violating the Law of the Sea" because Iran is simply not part of this legal system. This formal legal vacuum has constituted Tehran's largest defensive shield against Western legal pressure.

2. Repercussions of Entering New Protocols in

The Foreign Ministry's insistence on diplomatic formulas and the acceptance of any "new protocol" means voluntarily relinquishing this defensive shield, which will lead to the following strategic repercussions:

Entering into any internationally documented and written mechanism means Iran has voluntarily restricted its sovereignty over the Strait within global rules. From that moment on, if Iran wishes to use the Strait card to respond to sanctions or threats, its move will not be viewed as "legitimate defense," but rather as a "flagrant violation of the treaty." This shift will hand the West a ready-made legal pretext to issue binding resolutions in the Security Council and even legitimize military confrontation.

Tightening the Operational Noose on the Army and the IRGC:

The Iranian Armed Forces have so far maintained their field power in the Gulf by relying on this "legal ambiguity." Accepting international regulations and protocols will make any monitoring or deterrent measure by the Army and the Revolutionary Guard conditional on the approval of international oversight bodies, thereby shackling their operational capabilities in the world's most vital waterway.

Accepting International Oversight (Reproducing the NPT Scenario):

Baghaei's reference to "covering the costs of maritime security and the environment with the support of international bodies," despite its economic cover, contains a major trap. The entry of international funding and oversight means the deployment of inspectors, cameras, and global tracking systems in Gulf waters. This is an exact repetition of the strict oversight scenario of the International Atomic Energy Agency (in the mold of the Non-Proliferation Treaty), but this time targeting Iran's intelligence and military supervision over the Strait of Hormuz.

Baghaei's response to Khedrian showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not place the preservation of Iran's "traditional deterrence cards" at the top of its priorities.

The reality is that any signing of memoranda of understanding or international protocols in New York will transform Iran's asymmetric upper hand in the Strait of Hormuz into a mere paper commitment—a step whose final outcome will be the strategic disarmament of the Islamic Republic before a joint alliance comprising America, China, and the Gulf states.