Baghdad under Test: Nujaba Leader Arrested under U.S. Direction?

If reports circulating about the arrest of Hajj Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement Harakat al-Nujaba and the Intelligence Officer of the Baghdad Operations Belt Command within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), by a force affiliated with the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), allegedly under “U.S. direction,” are confirmed, Iraq is facing a development that goes far beyond the detention of a single individual.

This is not an ordinary security case.

It directly concerns Iraq’s sovereignty over its security decisions, overlapping institutional authorities, and the future relationship between the state’s official security agencies and the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Why al-yaqoubi? And Why the Baghdad Belt?

Al-Yaqoubi holds a sensitive intelligence position in an area considered one of the most strategically important components of Iraq’s security equation.

Any move by the Counter-Terrorism Service to detain a PMF intelligence official without clear coordination or a publicly disclosed judicial basis immediately raises a fundamental question:

Who issued the order?

And if the claim of “U.S. direction” is accurate, the question becomes even more serious:

Are Iraqi security agencies acting on an Iraqi decision—or implementing a U.S. security agenda inside Baghdad?

Is Washington Entering through the Security Door?

For resistance factions, this development could be interpreted as part of a broader effort to curtail the PMF’s influence, restrict its intelligence capabilities, and reshape the balance of power around the capital.

But two things must be distinguished.

If Al-Yaqoubi is wanted in connection with a legitimate legal case, then the judicial warrant and case file should be made clear.

If, however, the detention was carried out on the basis of an external political or security directive, then the issue becomes one of national sovereignty before it becomes a security matter.

The PMF is Not a Marginal Security Actor

The Popular Mobilization Forces are part of Iraq’s security apparatus under Iraqi law. At the same time, they possess political, military and intelligence structures connected to factions with significant influence.

That is precisely why any attempt to forcibly redefine their position—particularly inside the Baghdad Belt—could produce a dangerous institutional confrontation.

The problem is not the enforcement of the law.

The problem is using the law as a tool to redistribute power within the state.

The Most Dangerous Scenario: Clash between Institutions That are Supposed to be Allies

Any escalation between the Counter-Terrorism Service and the PMF could trigger:

Security mobilization around Baghdad;

➡️Mutual accusations of overstepping institutional authority;

➡️Urgent political intervention to contain the crisis;

➡️Escalation between political forces aligned with the PMF, the government and the security agencies.

The actions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, senior security officials and PMF leadership are likely to become critical in preventing the crisis from moving from the level of political decision-making to the streets.

The Question That Cannot be Avoided

If the operation is legal, where is the judicial warrant?

If it was an Iraqi decision, where is the Iraqi authorization?

And if it was carried out under external direction, who actually controls security decision-making in Baghdad?

These are not merely media questions.

They go to the very heart of the Iraqi state itself.

Iraq cannot afford to allow a struggle over influence to become a struggle inside its own security institutions.

And if the objective is to contain the PMF, using official state institutions to achieve that objective under external pressure or direction may not defuse the crisis.

It could ignite it from within.