Between Sovereignty and Commitment

Amid escalating tensions in the region, Iranian media over the past two days has reported serious discussions within official institutions, including the Islamic Consultative Assembly, about placing Iran’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the agenda. The argument being advanced is that there is no longer a justification for Iran’s continued membership in the treaty.

To understand the significance of this proposal, one must return to the foundations of the international legal system. International law is based on state sovereignty and consent, and the NPT binds only those states that have chosen to join it.

The treaty distinguishes between legally recognized nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states that have voluntarily agreed not to possess such weapons. Signatory states as non-nuclear powers—such as Iran—are legally committed not to pursue nuclear weapons, in exchange for their right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and their subjection to oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In contrast, states that have not signed the treaty—such as Israel—are not legally bound by its restrictions, even if they possess nuclear weapons in practice. What is often perceived as a “double standard” is, in fact, a structural feature of international law itself: obligations apply only to those who have consented to them.

The recent Iranian discourse builds on this point: if the treaty imposes strict constraints on Iran while failing to provide the protections and rights upon which it was founded—particularly in light of attacks on its nuclear facilities and the absence of effective deterrence—what is the rationale for remaining within it?

From the perspective of international law, there is no universal and absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, there are contractual obligations binding only those states that have agreed to them. Therefore, withdrawal from the treaty—if it occurs—would not constitute a violation of international law, but rather an exit from a framework of obligations that the state had previously accepted.

Conclusion:

The question is no longer simply, “Why does Israel possess nuclear weapons while Iran is not allowed to?” Rather, it has evolved into:

Why should Iran remain legally bound by constraints that other states do not observe, while not receiving the corresponding guarantees?