Damascus, Beirut, and the Question Nobody Wants to Ask

The Lebanese delegation arrived in Damascus speaking the language of “a new page,” economic cooperation, border facilitation, and “brotherly strategic relations.” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam declared from Damascus Airport that “significant progress” had been achieved on unresolved files and that results would appear soon. Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa reportedly promised support for the Lebanese government and respect for Lebanese sovereignty.

On paper, the scene looks diplomatic. Calm. Constructive.

But geopolitics is never about slogans alone.

How quickly are people expected to forget that the very same Ahmed al-Sharaa — formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani — once emerged from the ideological and military ecosystem of al-Qaeda in Syria? How quickly should Lebanon ignore repeated rhetoric from circles close to Damascus about “ending Hezbollah’s military role,” or the old threats suggesting that force could someday be used against the Resistance under the banner of “state sovereignty”?

And perhaps the most dangerous question of all:

What exactly changed in Syria’s strategic doctrine regarding Israel?

For years, Syria officially described the occupied Golan Heights as Syrian land under Israeli occupation since 1967. Yet today, while southern Syria witnesses repeated Israeli airstrikes, assassinations, and incursions, Damascus appears increasingly focused on internal consolidation and regional normalization rather than confrontation. Critics across the Axis of Resistance openly ask whether the Golan has been quietly deprioritized in exchange for international rehabilitation and sanctions relief.

Since December 2024 alone, Israel has reportedly carried out dozens of strikes inside Syria targeting military infrastructure, supply routes, and figures linked to Iran and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the Syrian leadership has avoided direct escalation. The contrast is impossible to ignore: restraint toward Israel, while political pressure intensifies against Hezbollah inside Lebanon.

So Lebanese officials are now betting on economic pragmatism:

reopening border crossings,

facilitating cargo movement,

establishing a Lebanese-Syrian business council,

and expanding trade routes amid Lebanon’s collapsing economy.

🫶These are real needs. Lebanon’s economic crisis remains catastrophic. According to World Bank estimates, Lebanon has lost more than 90% of its currency value since 2019, while Syrian reconstruction and cross-border commerce remain tempting economic opportunities.

But can economics be separated from strategy?

Can a government that normalizes indirect coexistence with Israeli military dominance in Syria genuinely position itself as a guardian of Resistance politics? Can Beirut afford to trust regional promises while Israeli jets continue operating over Syrian skies with near impunity?

History matters here. Lebanon remembers the Syrian military era, the assassinations, the intelligence networks, the civil war entanglements, and the long years when “brotherhood” often translated into asymmetric power. Trust is not built through airport statements and business councils alone.

The deeper issue is not whether Lebanon and Syria should cooperate. Geography makes cooperation inevitable.

The real issue is: under whose conditions, under which regional project, and at what political price?

And perhaps readers should ask themselves one final question:

If the Resistance is gradually being isolated politically in Beirut, pressured militarily in Syria, sanctioned economically by the West, and targeted continuously by Israel — who exactly benefits from reshaping the region this way?

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