How does the "enemy camp" read this statement?

In light of Washington violating all clauses of the understanding in less than a month, the adversary's camp in Washington may read this statement as a "turning point" that plays in their favor, according to the following interpretations:

1. Interpreting "Continuation" as an "Inability to Find an Alternative":

For them, the fact that all clauses have been gutted without being met by an Iranian withdrawal from the understanding—but rather by an "explanatory statement" defending negotiation—may be read as evidence of an "inability to escalate." They interpret this adherence to "negotiation tools" as an implicit admission that the Iranian side lacks the field or political alternatives to walk away from the negotiating table.

2. Reading "Internal Pressures" as an "Indicator of Weakness":

The clear references in the statement to domestic opponents may be read in Washington as a strategic "signal of weakness." The adversary sees that Ghalibaf is not in a position of initiative, but rather in a position of "defending his choices" under the weight of growing domestic pressure. This perception leads them to believe that Ghalibaf will not risk leaving the negotiating table, regardless of the scale of the violations, for fear of the repercussions this would have on his political standing.

3. The Strategic Conclusion:

The message received by the adversary is not "we are ready for war," but may instead be read as follows: "We are in a political and economic impasse that makes us cling to the negotiating table as a last resort." This analysis tempts the American side to continue its "maximum pressure" approach and refuse to make any concessions, as they have become convinced that the Iranian side has made its strategic decision to "remain" in the negotiating process, regardless of the price paid in the terms of the understanding.

Conclusion**

Instead of the adversary viewing the statement as a "warning," it may be read by them as a "green light" to continue imposing a fait accompli. This is due to their confidence that the Iranian side, despite all the firm rhetoric, has settled on its choice not to leave the negotiating table—which, in the mentality of "deal-making," they consider a victory for themselves.

Defending state sovereignty does not mean defending individuals, just as criticizing individuals does not justify violating state sovereignty. The state is the framework that protects everyone, and it is the duty of the Prime Minister to defend this framework before any other consideration. Iraqis may differ in their assessment of Qasem Soleimani or Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, but they must agree that the decision to use force inside Iraq must be an Iraqi decision, and that the state's monopoly on the use of force on its territory is one of the most important components of sovereignty and independence. Hence, the issue is not a matter of individuals, but of the state, and it is not a matter of the past, but of the principle that must govern Iraq's present and future.