Over the past week, Iran’s nuclear position has produced a remarkable amount of confusion — partly because of hostile or inaccurate reporting, but also because Tehran itself has not always spoken with one clear voice.
The sequence matters.
On September 24, President Masoud Pezeshkian sat down with Fox News’ Bret Baier in New York. Asked whether Iran was prepared to give up its uranium enriched to 60%, Pezeshkian said Tehran was prepared to dilute the material, accept verification and operate within the NPT framework. He also answered affirmatively when pressed about stopping enrichment at the 60% level.
That was a significant offer. But it was not the same thing as announcing that Iran had agreed to permanently abolish uranium enrichment.
In fact, Pezeshkian had told the UN only a day earlier that Iran would not surrender what it considers its right to peaceful nuclear technology.
Then came the report that created the real controversy.
On Monday, September 28, Saudi broadcaster Al-Hadath reported, citing sources in Pakistan involved in the mediation, that Iran had “agreed to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for easing American sanctions.” The report spread rapidly through international media and financial markets.
This point needs to be corrected because it has already been distorted online: this was not an announcement by Iranian state media. It originated with Al-Hadath, citing unnamed Pakistani sources.
Only hours later, the Iranian side pushed back.
An unnamed Iranian official told Press TV, Iran’s state-run English-language broadcaster, that reports of Iranian nuclear concessions were “false”, that Tehran’s nuclear position had not changed, and — even more strikingly — that the nuclear file was not then part of the ongoing discussions, which Tehran said were focused on the Strait of Hormuz.
So within roughly four days the outside world heard three different things:
• Pezeshkian: Iran can dilute its 60% stockpile and discuss stopping enrichment at that level.
• Al-Hadath: Iran has agreed to stop uranium enrichment in return for sanctions relief.
• Iranian officials: No — Iran’s nuclear position has not changed and reports of such an agreement are false.
And Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s latest public position makes the distinction clearer. In his September 27 interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, Araghchi defended enrichment to 60% as not prohibited in itself under Iran’s interpretation of its NPT obligations, while saying the 60% issue could again be negotiated if Washington demonstrated genuine willingness to reach an agreement. He did not announce acceptance of permanent “zero enrichment.”
There is another important distinction that much of the reporting misses: maintaining Iran’s enrichment capability or right is not the same as saying centrifuges are currently producing new 60% uranium.
The physical status of the programme remains unusually opaque after the attacks on Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. The IAEA’s last verified figure before losing continuity of knowledge was 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% as of June 13, 2025. The Agency subsequently said it could no longer reliably verify the current inventories and enrichment-related activity at the affected facilities.
That distinction is crucial.
Iran can therefore say simultaneously: we will not surrender enrichment as a national capability and we are prepared to reduce the enrichment level, dilute existing 60% material and accept verification.
Those positions are not inherently contradictory.
The communication surrounding them, however, has been.
And Tehran should take that seriously.
Iran has spent years arguing that there is a difference between peaceful enrichment under safeguards and the production of a nuclear weapon. When Iranian officials themselves leave enough ambiguity for headlines saying
“Iran accepts zero enrichment”
, they allow Washington to redefine Tehran’s negotiating position before an agreement has even been written.
That can have real consequences.
If American negotiators begin treating a total enrichment halt as something Iran has already conceded, any later Iranian rejection can be portrayed as Tehran “backtracking”. Pakistani and Qatari mediators also need exact language: does
“halt enrichment”
mean permanently dismantling centrifuges? Temporarily suspending enrichment? Ending only 60% production? Returning to enrichment below 5%? Those are radically different arrangements.
History proves the difference.
Under the 2015 JCPOA, Iran did not surrender enrichment. It accepted a ceiling of 3.67%, a stockpile limit of roughly 300 kg, and operation of 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz, together with extensive IAEA monitoring.
That is precisely why the wording matters today.
A future agreement could theoretically contain a similar formula: no 60% enrichment, dilution of the existing stockpile, intrusive verification and limits on centrifuges — while still preserving some Iranian enrichment on Iranian soil. Whether Washington would accept that remains one of the central disputes.
And as of September 30, there is still no breakthrough. Qatar continues carrying messages between the parties, while Donald Trump has publicly denied reports that he already offered sanctions relief and access to frozen Iranian funds in exchange for nuclear concessions. Reuters reports that the two sides remain apart despite the renewed mediation.
This is where Tehran needs discipline.
One can argue that Iran has legitimate security grievances, particularly after negotiations were repeatedly conducted under military pressure. One can also point out that the United States itself abandoned the JCPOA in 2018 after Iran had accepted sweeping nuclear restrictions.
But none of that excuses confused messaging.
When negotiations involve hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, billions of dollars in frozen assets, sanctions, oil exports, Hormuz and the possibility of another major war, the president, Foreign Ministry, nuclear authorities and state broadcasters cannot afford to leave the world guessing what Iran has actually agreed to.
Iran may eventually choose to compromise on the level of enrichment.
That is very different from surrendering the principle of enrichment.
The government needs to make that distinction unmistakable — because in negotiations this sensitive, an ambiguous sentence can become a concession before a single document has been signed.