Iraqi Elections: The Struggle for Influence and Political Transformations from 2010 to 2025

Introduction

The Iraqi elections are not merely a contest for parliamentary seats, but rather an arena of power struggle—between various factions, between popular forces and armed organizations operating parallel to the state, and between regional and international actors.

Over the past two decades, experience has shown that electoral victory does not guarantee control over governance due to the sectarian quota system and the political balances imposed on Iraq following the U.S. occupation in 2003.

2010 — The Victory of the “Iraqiya List” and the Failure to Form a Government

In the March 2010 elections, the Iraqiya List led by Iyad Allawi—a Shiite politician close to the United States—won the largest number of parliamentary seats (91).

Washington presented this list as a “moderate national alternative” to the Shiite parties aligned with Iran and viewed it as an opportunity to restore political balance after Nouri al-Maliki’s first term.

However, Allawi failed to form the largest bloc in parliament due to post-election coalitions led by al-Maliki, supported by Shiite and Kurdish parties and indirectly backed by Tehran.

This event marked a turning point: Washington realized that ballot boxes alone do not guarantee its interests unless accompanied by post-election political engineering.

2018 — American Diplomatic Intervention and Efforts to Influence Alliances

After the May 2018 elections, the United States reemerged in the Iraqi scene through an intense diplomatic campaign led by U.S. envoy Brett McGurk, who played an active role in the government formation process.

Reports from Reuters and The Washington Post at the time revealed that McGurk held repeated meetings with Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders to coordinate a pro-Western alliance.

The American objective was to prevent Iran-aligned forces from seizing power; yet, those efforts failed due to strong domestic resistance and the complexity of internal balances.

Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government was formed despite Washington’s reservations, after which the U.S. began exploiting public anger by supporting the October 2019 protest movement that ultimately brought down the government.

2021 — The Sadrist Movement’s Victory and the Failure to Form a Majority Bloc

In the October 2021 elections, the Sadrist Movement won first place with 73 seats and sought to form a “national majority” government in alliance with Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and Khamis al-Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance.

However, the majority project failed due to disputes over sovereign positions and the resistance of the Coordination Framework—a coalition of Shiite forces and resistance factions that view U.S. influence as a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty.

The Sadrists withdrew from parliament, leaving the stage for the Coordination Framework to form the current government. Observers noted that this withdrawal weakened Washington’s undeclared project to reorganize the political blocs in line with its regional interests.

2022 — The Sadrist Withdrawal and Pressure through Saraya al-Salam

After the failure of the majority bloc project, the Sadrist Movement turned to its armed wing, Saraya al-Salam, as a tool of political and popular pressure.

In August 2022, Sadrist supporters stormed the Green Zone — home to the parliament and government buildings — with implicit support from then-Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who was accused by opponents of closeness to Washington.

From a local Iraqi perspective, the storming was not a coup against the state but rather an attempt to restore balance within the political process and reject monopolization of power.

The Popular Mobilization Forces, as an official arm of the Iraqi state, intervened to protect government institutions and contain the crisis.

In the aftermath, Muqtada al-Sadr announced his withdrawal from politics, maintaining his symbolic role as an external voice of opposition.