The outlines of a new struggle for influence in northern Syria are beginning to emerge. Israeli assessments suggest that the Syrian army could expand from 100,000 to 200,000 personnel within five years, while acquiring Bayraktar TB2 drones, armored vehicles, and air defense systems.
However, the deeper concern is not the number of troops, but rather Turkish radar and air defense systems that could restrict Israel’s air superiority over Syria and complicate its strategic calculations, including operations directed toward Iran.
Yet, frankly, part of this “concern” is exaggerated. Israeli analysts themselves acknowledge that Damascus currently possesses only one or two operational combat aircraft, and that rebuilding a genuine military force requires between five and ten years. The core issue, therefore, is more political than military.
Evidence that Israel’s red line concerns “technology, not numbers” came on August 18, 2026.
Israel struck Abu al-Duhur Air Base days after warning Damascus that deploying Turkish radar systems and forces there would constitute a threat to its security, according to the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), The Times of Israel, and Reuters.
A few months earlier, in May, units of the newly formed Syrian army participated for the first time since the fall of the Assad government in Turkey’s EFES 2026 military exercises.
Meanwhile, reports from Ankara in January revealed that Turkey was considering selling Bayraktar TB2 drones to Damascus. Turkish military personnel deployed in northwestern Syria are estimated to number more than 20,000.
The paradox is that Ahmed al-Sharaa’s (al-Jolani’s) government finds itself trapped.
It needs Turkey to rebuild its army after years of war and continuous Israeli bombardment, while simultaneously facing American pressure to reach a security agreement with Tel Aviv.
The September 17 confrontation at the UN Security Council summarized the situation: Israel accused Turkey of
“occupying its neighbor,”
while Ankara responded that Israel itself was destabilizing the region.
An October 8 report by the Bloomsbury Institute for Security and Intelligence (BISI) went further, arguing that Syria would remain hostage to this dilemma and that any Syrian military progress would likely be met with intermittent Israeli preemptive strikes over the medium term.
More importantly, from a strategic perspective, this trajectory places Syria deeper within an increasingly multipolar international equation (Turkey–Russia–China–BRICS countries), gradually reducing the American-Israeli monopoly over Syrian airspace.
Latest Developments as of Publication — November 16, 2026:
Following the cessation of Israeli bombardment in March and the tensions surrounding Abu al-Duhur in August, indirect contacts between Tel Aviv and Damascus continue in pursuit of a security agreement whose outcome remains uncertain.
Meanwhile, Israeli reports today increasingly warn of an accelerated Turkish-Arab effort to arm the Syrian military, with observers expecting Israel to continue carrying out preemptive strikes against any air defense infrastructure established on Syrian territory.

