Lebanon First: Lessons for Those Standing in the Last Trenches of the Resistance Axis

Abstract

This article examines the evolving security and political dynamics in Lebanon following the Israeli war on southern Lebanon (2023–2024) and the ceasefire agreement of November 2024. It argues that international resolutions—particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1701—have failed to protect Lebanon’s sovereignty and have instead undermined its national defense posture. The article analyzes the continued Israeli violations, the political manipulation of reconstruction aid, and the policy of targeted assassinations. It also addresses the implications of the Syrian military’s recent crackdown on the Druze uprising in Sweida (July 16, 2025) and how this development signals a renewed threat to Lebanese sovereignty from the Syrian front. The study warns that the neutralization of Hezbollah under international pressure could leave Lebanon exposed to regional destabilization from both Israel and Syria.

Introduction

The slogan “Lebanon First” has shifted from a political catchphrase to a stark warning. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in August 2006, Lebanon has endured the fallout of a fragile peace that exists more on paper than in reality. Rather than ending hostilities, the resolution has allowed Israel to continue its violations of Lebanese sovereignty while the international community largely turned a blind eye.

The deeper danger lies in the growing pressure to dismantle Hezbollah’s deterrent capabilities under the guise of enforcing international resolutions. Such moves do not neutralize threats; they instead strip Lebanon of its only real means of defense against Israeli aggression and regional encroachments.

1. Southern Lebanon: An Open Front with No Protection

Despite Hezbollah’s compliance with Resolution 1701, including its withdrawal north of the Litani River, UNIFIL documented over 13,000 Israeli violations by the end of 2023—primarily aerial incursions and land border breaches (“UNIFIL Reports” 2024).

During the 2023–2024 war, Israel launched a devastating campaign in southern Lebanon that resulted in more than 4,000 civilian deaths and 17,000 injuries, before an uneasy ceasefire was brokered in November 2024. However, the ceasefire failed to stop Israel from conducting:

• Near-daily reconnaissance flights over southern Lebanon,

• Sporadic missile attacks,

• Targeted assassinations of resistance figures on Lebanese soil using drones.

Between December 2024 and July 2025 alone, these violations caused 231 additional deaths and 528 injuries, alongside the displacement of over 1.4 million civilians (Al Jazeera, Nov. 2024).

2. Reconstruction as a Tool of Political Pressure

The international community’s pledges of $3.2 billion in reconstruction aid remain largely unfulfilled. Gulf states and Western donors have tied the release of funds to political conditions, notably the disarmament of Hezbollah. Moreover, some southern families were reportedly required to sign statements condemning Hezbollah in exchange for receiving financial compensation (Lebanon Public Works Ministry, 2022).

This exploitation of civilian suffering for political leverage highlights the coercive use of aid as a means to undermine resistance factions within Lebanon.

3. Assassinations as an Ongoing Strategy

Despite Hezbollah’s compliance with the geographical restrictions of Resolution 1701, Israeli assassination operations inside Lebanon have escalated. The killing of Saleh al-Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’s political bureau, in Beirut in January 2024, was a stark reminder that no Lebanese territory is off-limits for Israeli operations (Reuters, Jan. 2024).

These targeted killings—repeated across the south, Beirut suburbs, and the Bekaa region—expose the Lebanese Armed Forces’ incapacity to protect national sovereignty, a vulnerability exacerbated by the military’s dependence on foreign funding and political influence (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2023).