#️⃣ Part One
The Iranian government headed by Masoud Pezeshkian is facing an unprecedented legitimacy crisis, with three sovereign and key ministries now being run by acting officials amid the prolonged suspension of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) and sharp disputes over the legality of major government decisions — most notably the memorandum of understanding with Washington.
The Martyrdom of the Defense Minister, Followed by the Intelligence Minister
The crisis began on February 28, 2026, with the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
On February 28, Iranian state television announced the martyrdom of Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi.
Less than three weeks later, on March 18, President Pezeshkian officially announced the martyrdom of Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an Israeli assassination operation.
As a result, the government lost two key sovereign ministers in less than a month, with no permanent successors appointed to either position to this day.
Following their deaths, Major General Seyyed Majid Ebn al-Reza was appointed acting defense minister, while the situation at the Intelligence Ministry remains unclear regarding any formal appointment.
Both ministries have therefore remained under temporary administration beyond the legally permitted time limits.
Suspension of Parliament: Security Necessity or Political Decision?
On March 9, ten days after the war began, security instructions were issued suspending sessions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.
According to a report by the Fasl-e Sevvom news agency:
“Parliament had effectively been shut down since the first day of the war because of the lack of security and the possibility that it could be targeted by the enemy.”
No parliamentary sessions were held.
However, the suspension, which lasted for more than four months, eventually developed into a serious legal crisis.
MP Kamran Ghazanfari, representing Tehran, revealed that claims that the Supreme National Security Council had issued an order suspending parliamentary sessions were “incorrect.”
He accused Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of preventing public parliamentary sessions from taking place during the previous four months
“without any legal basis.”
Ghazanfari added that:
“The closure of the public chamber was intended to prevent MPs from objecting to the course of the negotiations and the acceptance of the ceasefire.”
He said lawmakers repeatedly asked Ghalibaf to present the alleged decision if it actually existed:
“But he has shown nothing until now. Therefore, this claim has no basis and is simply a lie.”
Although the parliamentary speaker had the authority under the legislature’s internal regulations to convene a public session, he did not do so, raising serious questions about the real reasons behind the suspension.
According to ILNA, claims that a decision had been issued by the Supreme National Security Council were also “incorrect.”
The agency reported that several lawmakers had asked Ghalibaf one or two months earlier to produce the alleged decision if it genuinely existed, but he failed to provide any document or evidence proving it.
After Parliament reopened in July 2026, sessions shifted to a virtual, online format.
However, the new arrangement did not resolve the crisis. Instead, it created additional technical and legal complications.
The online sessions faced the problem of MPs being unable to vote electronically, preventing the approval of legislation and regulations.
Parliamentary oversight procedures, including the questioning and interpellation of ministers, were also effectively suspended.
Some lawmakers experienced internet disruptions, around 50 MPs were absent from the first virtual session, and the number of weekly parliamentary sessions was reduced from three to only two.
LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN PEZESHKIAN’S GOVERNMENT: Three Ministries Without Ministers and a Paralyzed Parliament
#️⃣ Part Two
Legal Doubts Over the Memorandum of Understanding: Quorum Defect and the Absence of Parliament
On June 15, 2026, the Supreme National Security Council officially announced that a “memorandum of understanding had been reached to end the war between Iran and the United States,” stressing that the agreement was “based on a decision by the Supreme National Security Council.”
The preliminary version was electronically signed that same day on behalf of Iran by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, in his capacity as head of the negotiating delegation.
Then, on June 18, President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the final text of the memorandum alongside U.S. President Donald Trump, after the planned in-person ceremony in Switzerland was cancelled.
President Pezeshkian justified the move by saying that 11 out of 13 members of the Supreme National Security Council had supported the memorandum.
However, Parliament’s complete absence from the process, combined with deep divisions within the legislative institution, raised serious legal questions over the memorandum.
MPs who were unable to access the parliamentary chamber had no opportunity to debate or vote on the agreement. Even after Parliament reopened in mid-July, criticism persisted that the deal had been concluded “behind Parliament’s back.”
• This raises a highly important legal issue:
During the Supreme National Security Council session that approved the memorandum, the defense minister and intelligence minister were supposed to vote as members of the council.
The defense minister is a member depending on the subject under discussion, while the intelligence minister is a permanent member.
However, neither ministry had an appointed minister at the time. Both were being run by acting officials following the deaths of their original ministers.
Under the law, an acting minister may attend Supreme National Security Council meetings, but does not have voting rights.
This means that the memorandum was deprived of two key sovereign votes and that, in principle, the council session lacked the required legal quorum, regardless of who attended or voted.
The presence of acting ministers does not resolve this defect because their participation is consultative rather than voting.
If we add to this the fact that the memorandum did not pass through the Islamic Consultative Assembly in accordance with Articles 77 and 125 of the Constitution — which require parliamentary approval for binding international agreements before final signature — the constitutional problem becomes twofold:
A defect in the composition of the approving council, and a defect in the constitutional process through which the agreement was signed.
The Supreme Leader’s Approval: Political Cover That Does Not Resolve the Constitutional Defect
On June 18, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in a message addressed to the Iranian people, announced that he had “given permission” for the memorandum of understanding to be signed, even though he said he had initially held a different view.
He justified his position by saying that President Pezeshkian, in his capacity as chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, had given him a commitment on behalf of himself and the council members to protect the rights of the Iranian people and the Resistance Front, while accepting responsibility for doing so.
This approval provides the memorandum with political and religious cover, given the Supreme Leader’s position as Vali-ye Faqih and holder of absolute guardianship.
However, it does not resolve the structural constitutional defects surrounding the memorandum’s approval process, nor does it correct the legal violations that allegedly occurred.
The Supreme Leader did not repeal an explicit constitutional provision requiring parliamentary approval of international agreements, nor did he exempt the Supreme National Security Council from the requirement concerning the participation and voting rights of the two sovereign ministers.
• More seriously, this context risks creating a dangerous precedent in the way major sovereign decisions are handled:
Strategic agreements being signed while two sovereign ministries are without ministers, Parliament is suspended, and approval from the Supreme Leader is then invoked to justify legitimacy.
If repeated, such a pattern could hollow out constitutional mechanisms and make major national decisions dependent on the preferences of the executive branch and the timing of religious approval, rather than on clear, predetermined legal procedures.