#️⃣ Part One

His Eminence Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s message marking November 4 reveals a fundamental shift in Shiite military doctrine.

This shift is rooted in a controversial jurisprudential interpretation that grants the Wali al-Faqih (Guardian Jurist) the authority to declare

“offensive jihad” (Jihad al-Ibtida’i),

thereby providing religious legitimacy to recent military operations — such as Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes against American military bases — that extends beyond their characterization as mere “reactions” and instead frames them as a preemptive offensive initiative.

The integration of jurisprudential legitimacy with military capabilities paves the way for a strategic transition from

“defensive resilience” to “offensive initiative”

through a unified

regional front.

First: The Jurisprudential Position on “Offensive Jihad” During the Occultation

In Islamic jurisprudence, Jihad al-Ibtida’i (offensive jihad) is defined as initiating armed combat against polytheists and nonbelievers for the purpose of inviting them to Islam, rather than responding to an act of aggression.

During the occultation of the Infallible Imam, jurists hold differing positions:

The Majority Jurisprudential Position (The Predominant View):

Most classical Shiite jurists, including Sheikh al-Tusi, al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, and al-Shahid al-Thani, maintain that offensive jihad is impermissible during the occultation unless explicitly authorized by the Infallible Imam or his specifically appointed representative.

According to this position, authorization from a qualified Islamic jurist alone is insufficient.

Imam Khomeini’s Position:

Despite adopting the doctrine of

Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih al-Mutlaqah),

Imam Khomeini excluded offensive jihad from the jurist’s authority, maintaining that the powers of the Guardian Jurist do not extend to initiating armed jihad.

The Dissenting Contemporary Position:

Sayyed Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, and Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr are presented as adopting a position that differs from the predominant traditional view.

According to this interpretation, a fully qualified Islamic jurist may authorize offensive jihad when the circumstances and broader interests require it.