#️⃣ Part Two

Second: From “Retaliation” to “Offensive Jihad” — How Does the Statement Provide Religious Legitimacy for Offensive Initiative?

The significance of the November 4 message lies in its precise characterization of recent military operations.

Sayyed Mojtaba does not merely describe Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and the targeting of American military bases as a “response” to aggression. He goes further, characterizing these actions as

“offensive jihad against arrogance at the regional level.”

This characterization carries two strategic implications:

1. Legitimizing Past Operations:

It affirms that these operations, which appear to have been carried out under previous orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (the martyred Khamenei), were based on prior jurisprudential authorization from the Wali al-Faqih (Guardian Jurist).

This provides them with religious legitimacy even in the leader’s absence.

2. Establishing a Precedent for the Future:

It establishes the principle that the Wali al-Faqih possesses the authority to declare

“offensive jihad” (Jihad al-Ibtida’i),

thereby laying the legal and jurisprudential groundwork for similar decisions in the future.

This is particularly significant given the warning that any renewed acts of aggression

“will be met with a much broader scope of targeting.”