Russian strategic thinker Sergey Karaganov, one of the most prominent advocates of strengthening Russia’s nuclear deterrence, has once again raised the level of his warning to an unprecedented point.

His argument, in simple terms, is brutally stark: if the current conflict turns into a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO’s European powers, Moscow could initially launch large-scale conventional strikes. But if the escalation continues, then, according to his view, Russia could move toward the limited use of nuclear weapons against European targets.

This does not mean that Moscow has made a decision to use nuclear weapons. Karaganov is neither a minister nor a military commander. The significance of his words comes from the fact that he represents a school of Russian strategic thought that has for years advocated lowering the nuclear threshold and convincing Europe that a war with Russia will not remain a distant and relatively safe conflict confined to Ukrainian territory.

The strategic message is clear:

Moscow wants to plant doubt in the mind of every European decision-maker: Is a direct confrontation with Russia worth the risk of turning Berlin, Warsaw, London, or other European capitals into part of a nuclear battlefield?

And here lies the most dangerous element of Karaganov’s doctrine: threatening catastrophe in order to prevent catastrophe — raising the level of fear to the point where the adversary is forced to retreat before a full-scale war erupts.

But the Orthodox Christian dimension invoked by Karaganov makes the issue even more complex.

Orthodox Christianity does not regard war as something sacred in itself. Even the official social doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church describes war as an evil and emphasizes proportionality in the use of force, the protection of civilians, and the principle that patriotism cannot be used to justify immoral means.

So when an Orthodox Christian says,

“I understand that innocent people and children may die, and I find that horrifying, but we may be driven to it,”

it exposes the profound moral dilemma at the heart of nuclear deterrence.

From a Christian perspective, military victory does not erase sin.

The killing of civilians does not become good simply because a state considers a war necessary, and millions of human beings cannot be reduced to numbers inside a geopolitical equation.

Karaganov, however, approaches the issue from a different perspective. He argues that failing to frighten Europe now could eventually lead to an even larger and bloodier world war.

And this is precisely where the danger of his logic lies — he proposes approaching the gates of hell in order to convince the adversary to retreat before those gates are opened.

That is exactly what makes these statements far more serious than a mere media threat.

We are witnessing a battle of wills and psychological deterrence between Russia and NATO, where the question is no longer simply who possesses the more advanced missiles, but rather:

Who will be the first to believe that the other side is genuinely prepared to press the button?

And the closer both sides come to convincing each other of that possibility, the stronger deterrence becomes… but the more capable a single mistake becomes of triggering a war from which there may be no return.