Smotrich at a Tel Aviv conference (September 2025)

Donald Trump’s newly published 20–21 point plan for Gaza (hereafter “the Plan”) was announced with theatrical fanfare: a rapid ceasefire, the return of hostages within 72 hours, the staged withdrawal of Israeli forces, the demilitarization of Gaza, a foreign-supervised technocratic “board” to run a transitional Gaza led by Trump himself (with Tony Blair and others named), mass reconstruction financed by international donors, and amnesty or safe passage for Hamas members who disarm. The document promises a “New Gaza” — prosperous, deradicalized, and integrated into regional economic frameworks — conditioned on Hamas’s immediate acceptance.

At first glance, the document reads like a marketing brochure for a political triumph: dramatic hostage returns, reconstruction headlines, and an international “peace board” presided over by a former U.S. president. But when you strip away the slogans, the Plan collapses into a set of mutually contradictory premises and unenforceable demands. Below I set out the central geopolitical and practical reasons to be highly skeptical — and to expect that the Plan will fail, or worse, make the war’s aftermath more volatile.

1) There is no Palestinian ownership — legitimacy is fatal to implementation

Successful deals require at least the tacit consent of the political actors who control territory and populations. This Plan demands the surrender of Hamas’s military and political role before meaningful guarantees are delivered; it envisages a technocratic, externally imposed transition in Gaza without Hamas as a partner. That is not a compromise, it is a recipe for rejection. Palestinian actors — not least Hamas’s base inside Gaza — will not accept a top-down plan that treats Gaza as a space to be “managed” by outside powers and lavish technocrats. Internationally brokered governance projects can work only when local leaders have incentives to buy in; here, those incentives are one-sided and coercive. Reporting already notes that Hamas has not accepted the Plan and is “studying” it through mediators.

2) The Plan’s sequencing creates perverse incentives and creates a security vacuum

The formula — hostages first, then large prisoner releases and amnesty for disarmed militants, then reconstruction and normalization — hands Israel and its supporters maximal leverage and hands Gaza minimal agency. It offers Hamas two terrible choices: accept what looks like political extinction, or refuse and risk continued massive Israeli military action backed by the United States. Removing Hamas as an organizing political force while leaving deeply damaged institutions and millions of traumatized civilians will not produce stability; it will produce radicalized, fragmented resistance—guerrilla and underground networks that are far harder to defeat than a visible organization. Multiple analysts and reporting point out that Israel itself plans to retain significant security control and the IDF would remain “in most of the territory,” undermining the Plan’s promise of sovereignty or local control.

3) Demilitarization as a one-time event is a fantasy

The Plan treats “demilitarization” as a technical exercise: destroy tunnels and weapons, monitor with “independent” observers, and voilà — Gaza is peaceful. History and the logic of insurgency show otherwise. Demilitarizing popular armed movements requires either sustained, legitimate political integration or permanent occupation. If the former is absent — and the Plan excludes Hamas from governance and punishes its social presence — militant networks will go clandestine. The Israeli military has repeatedly warned that eliminating an organizational center (Hamas) does not eliminate the insurgent potential embedded in society; INSS simulations and other Israeli strategic papers have concluded that deep ground operations can produce prolonged guerrilla warfare and a humanitarian catastrophe that fuels renewed resistance rather than compliance.

4) Enforcement: who polices the

polices?

The Plan depends on an “International Stabilization Force” and monitors to verify demilitarization and distribution of aid — but it does not create credible enforcement mechanisms if either side violates the compact. The “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump and populated by Western political figures (e.g., Tony Blair) is an odd governance model: it lacks legal authority, troop commitments, or the trust of Palestinians who would see it as an occupier’s instrument. If Israel claims that Hamas violated demilitarization, the U.S. and Israel already have stated willingness to resume force. If Israel re-enters or retains security control, the illusion of Palestinian self-rule evaporates. Conversely, if the international force is empowered and it confronts Israel, Washington would face a profound political dilemma with its closest ally. The Plan relies on wishful, rather than credible, guarantees.

5) Reconstruction conditionality and the danger of reward without accountability

The Plan ties massive reconstruction funds to political outcomes (disarmament, new governance, economic zones). This echoes past episodes where conditional aid was promised but delivered piecemeal, politicized, or monopolized by cronies. Donors will be wary: funding reconstruction in a territory still contested and under partial occupation risks legal, reputational, and security exposure. Moreover, rewarding an actor (Israel) for aggressive conquest by paying for reconstruction and normalization would produce a perverse precedent: aggression becomes profitable. That is precisely why many Arab publics and governments express skepticism about normalization incentives that reward the victor while leaving victims uncompensated.

6) Regional dynamics and spoilers make a clean outcome unlikely

Many regional players (Qatar, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Hizbollah and other non-state actors) have stakes in Gaza’s future. Some have been couriers between Hamas and the outside world; others support rival Palestinian authorities. The Plan claims broad regional backing in public statements, but geopolitical interests diverge: states will not accept an arrangement that undermines their influence or that could trigger domestic backlash (e.g., refugee flows, security spillover). Meanwhile, actors hostile to U.S. or Israeli hegemony will exploit any opening to deepen their role. The result is a complex multipolar contest in which a unilaterally designed transitional regime is unlikely to control outcomes on the ground.

7) Legal and moral blindspots: accountability and justice are sidelined

The Plan’s emphasis on rapid amnesty for disarming fighters and the reuse of a “technocratic” governance model short-circuits questions of accountability for alleged war crimes, for massive civilian losses, and for forced displacement. International justice mechanisms (e.g., ICC investigations, UN fact-finding) remain politically and legally autonomous; a political deal that absolves powerful actors without due process will be contested, perhaps even obstructed, by human rights institutions and public opinion. This raises the prospect of a fragile “peace” that is neither just nor durable.