Special Article for the “Imposed Peace” Series

In the midst of protracted regional conflicts, the concept of “imposed peace” is gradually transforming from an exceptional situation into a recurring strategy in how global powers manage complex crises. From the Sochi meetings, which branched off from the Astana process to address the Syrian crisis, to the secret negotiations between Iran and the United States in Oman in 2025, the same pattern emerges: settlements imposed under the threat of escalation, and ceasefires drafted outside the framework of full sovereignty or the genuine will of local populations.

What links Sochi and Muscat? And what are the similarities and differences between these rounds of negotiations, where all parties are pushed toward a so-called “solution,” yet under conditions often shaped by political coercion and external pressure?

First: The Sochi Talks — Settlements at the Expense of Sovereignty

The Sochi meetings, which began in 2018 under the joint sponsorship of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, served as a practical extension of the Astana military and political process. These meetings aimed to impose a “de-escalation” formula in Idlib and Syria more broadly. However, at their core, they institutionalized a form of power-sharing rather than producing a sustainable resolution to the Syrian conflict.

Key Features of the Sochi Talks: • Russia positioned itself as the strong mediator — at times acting as a guarantor, and at other times threatening to use force.

• Turkey leveraged the negotiations to secure its southern borders, particularly concerning the Kurdish issue and control over Idlib.

• Iran supported the process, viewing it as an opportunity to solidify its presence on the ground and strengthen its role within the broader regional balance of power.

Nevertheless, the results were fragile. The Syrian battlefield continued to fluctuate between temporary ceasefires and renewed clashes justified by various pretexts. Meanwhile, the political file remained frozen, awaiting broader agreements that extended beyond the influence of regional players. And eventually , the opposition was able to take over the country and rule Syria .

Second: Muscat 2025 — Negotiations Under Fire

In 2025, while open military confrontations between Israel and Iran escalated, and U.S. threats against Iranian nuclear facilities intensified — culminating in direct strikes just days ago — Oman once again emerged as a discreet channel for tense dialogue between Washington and Tehran.

What Distinguishes These Negotiations? • They unfold amidst active military escalation, unlike the previous nuclear talks of 2015, which occurred primarily under economic pressure.

• The U.S. is relying on a “smart attrition” strategy aimed at weakening Iran through cumulative pressures without triggering an all-out war — reminiscent of how the West imposed “peace” on Libya after 2011, though in Iran’s case, the approach is more gradual. However, despite ongoing negotiations, U.S. forces targeted Iranian nuclear sites, and now Washington openly discusses the idea of regime change.

• Tehran is negotiating from a weakened position. Although its missile and nuclear capabilities withstood the limited strikes, the leadership understands that full-scale escalation could spiral beyond control, further undermining its stance — particularly given that Iran’s key allies, such as Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Houthis, are severely strained.

Third: Similarities and Differences — Same Tools, Different Arenas

Despite the differing nature of the conflicts in Syria and Iran, the essence of the negotiations held in both Sochi and Muscat reveals striking similarities in mechanisms and objectives, though the specifics vary.

In Sochi, the Syrian crisis was primarily internal, yet deeply entangled with regional and international interventions.

Russia sought to play the role of guarantor, though always within the logic of advancing its strategic interests. Turkey exploited the talks to advance its border security agenda, particularly regarding Kurdish regions and Idlib. Iran, for its part, viewed the process as a means to consolidate its influence, secure the “Resistance Axis” stretching through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and enhance its regional foothold.

. Iran finds itself in direct confrontation with the United States amidst military escalation with Israel and real American threats targeting its nuclear infrastructure. Yet, Washington has maintained discreet channels via Oman, seeking to impose a “conditional peace” that may temporarily freeze the crisis without offering genuine guarantees for lifting sanctions or halting the broader campaign of attrition.

In both instances, negotiations take place under the shadow of military pressure and within an asymmetrical power dynamic. The stronger party seeks to dictate terms, while the weaker actor attempts to absorb the blows and buy time.

The fundamental difference, however, lies in the stakes: Syria became an arena for regional and international power-sharing, while Iran today faces an existential confrontation threatening its national security and nuclear program. Both Tehran and Washington understand that an all-out war serves neither side, making negotiations more a tool for delaying confrontation than a pathway to resolving core issues.

Fourth: Have the Negotiations Produced Real Solutions?

The short answer is clear: temporary arrangements, without addressing root causes.

• In Syria, de-escalation zones held — albeit briefly — but the fundamental questions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the future of opposition forces remain suspended, trapped within the chessboard of foreign powers.

• In Iran, the Muscat talks superficially eased tensions initially and opened the door to technical discussions around the nuclear program. Yet, they failed to halt the U.S. attrition strategy or eliminate broader strategic risks. On the contrary, the military confrontation with Israel is growing more dangerous for both sides.

In essence, whether in Sochi or Muscat, “imposed peace” produces fragile truces, not lasting solutions, leaving crises perpetually simmering — ready to reignite when major powers deem it necessary. In the case of Muscat, tragically, the result has been a rapid escalation of both military and security tensions.

Conclusion: Recycling the Libyan Model with Modified Versions

From Libya to Syria, and now to Iran, the “imposed peace” model persists — solutions enforced by pressure or force, orchestrated beyond the will of affected nations. The difference lies in geography and capacity: Iran is not Libya, Syria is not an isolated island. Yet the pattern remains — tools of coercion, cycles of negotiations, alternating between calculated escalation and temporary calm.

The critical question remains:

Can regional actors break free from this imposed formula?

Or will the “imposed peace” doctrine continue to evolve, merely changing names and locations, while preserving the same strategic logic?

Sources:

Western Sources: • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Sochi Agreement and the Future of Syria,” 2019.

• The Washington Post, “Secret U.S.-Iran Oman Talks Aim to Ease Tensions,” 2025.

• Foreign Affairs, “Imposed Peace in the Middle East: From Libya to Iran,” 2024.

• Reuters, “Iran, U.S. Hold Backchannel Nuclear Talks in Oman,” June 2025.

Arab Sources: • Al-Mayadeen TV, “Muscat Talks Between Tehran and Washington: A Window to Avoid War?” 2025.

• Asharq Al-Awsat, “Sochi Agreements: Power-Sharing or Real Solutions for Syria?” 2019.

• Al Jazeera Net, “Astana and Sochi: Milestones in the Syrian Settlement,” 2020.

• Al-Akhbar Newspaper (Lebanon), “Regional Escalation and Negotiations: Iran is Not Libya,” 2025.