Syria has Not Become a “Normal State” Yet — the Strategic Paradox (2)

The Reality on the Ground

While Washington presents the lifting of the designation as a pathway toward Syria’s economic recovery, human rights organizations and independent monitoring bodies continue to report serious allegations of violence and sectarian persecution.

Mass atrocities: Human rights organizations have documented the deaths of large numbers of civilians since the fall of the Assad government. Violence along Syria’s coast in March 2025, particularly against members of the Alawite community, triggered international concern, with reports of executions and widespread abuses.

Minorities under pressure: Alawites, Christians, and Druze continue to face concerns over violence, displacement, intimidation, and attacks against their communities, with the nature and scale of abuses varying from one area to another.

Detention and torture: Human rights organizations continue to report arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and other abuses affecting detainees held by armed factions and security structures.

Economic devastation: Millions of Syrians remain dependent on humanitarian assistance, while the country continues to suffer from poverty, inflation, shortages, and widespread destruction of infrastructure.

And this is where a fundamental point must be made:

Removing Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list does not mean that Syria has become a normal state.

The decision represents a significant legal, political, and economic shift, but it does not transform a country emerging from a prolonged war into a stable state overnight.

Syria continues to suffer from weak institutions, the proliferation of weapons, deep social and sectarian divisions, economic and humanitarian crises, and unresolved issues involving abuses, accountability, and the protection of minorities.

Indeed, the paradox is that Washington can simultaneously normalize its relationship with Damascus while still considering the Syrian environment unsafe for its own citizens. Removing the designation does not mean that security risks have disappeared, nor that terrorism and human rights files have been closed.

Therefore, a distinction must be made between normalizing relations with Syria’s new authorities and normalizing Syria itself as a state.

The former has already begun.

The latter will require years of institution-building, establishing the state’s monopoly over weapons, strengthening the rule of law, protecting all citizens, and holding those responsible for abuses accountable.

The Lebanese Dimension

The repercussions may extend far beyond Syria’s borders.

President Trump has publicly linked Washington’s engagement with Damascus to demands that al-Shara’a confront Hezbollah and its regional network.

This raises a broader strategic question:

What happens when a former jihadist organization, which has only recently gained international legitimacy, is given a greater security role along the border with Lebanon?

For Lebanon’s Shiite and Christian communities, this possibility is particularly sensitive.

Any attempt by Damascus to dismantle a military or security power inside Lebanon could transform existing tensions into a much broader sectarian and regional confrontation.

The Strategic Paradox

Washington believes that removing Syria from the terrorism framework will facilitate economic normalization, reconstruction, and regional stability.

But legitimacy carries consequences.

The United States is effectively betting that political integration can transform a former rebel movement into a responsible state actor.

That experiment is now underway.

But international legitimacy also provides the new authorities with economic resources, diplomatic recognition, and security capabilities—potentially enabling them to expand their influence beyond Syria’s borders.

And this is where the most dangerous question lies: (3)

Will international recognition moderate Syria’s new leadership and lead to the construction of an institutional state—or will it give them the power to reproduce their influence through new tools?

Washington calls it normalization.

Damascus calls it a new beginning.

But for Lebanon, the question may be far more dangerous.

The issue is no longer simply:

Will Syria become stable?

It is:

What will the new Syria do once it becomes more powerful, more legitimate, and more open to the world?

Will this mark the beginning of genuine Syrian stability—or the beginning of a new phase of competition, influence, and security threats across the region?

The United States has not given Syria a certificate declaring that it has become a normal state.

It has simply changed the way it deals with Syria.

And the difference between the two is enormous.