The New Damascus Balances: Street Governance

Eighteen months after the fall of the Ba'athist regime in December 2024, Syria's transitional administration, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani), is striving to transition from an armed faction into a sovereign central authority.

This transition faces complex field tests centered on containing "ISIS" cells, reshaping the relationship with Kurdish forces, and dealing with international attempts to utilize Damascus against regional powers.

The "ISIS" Front and the Detainees File

Despite divergent ideological origins within the Islamist spectrum, the clash between al-Sharaa's government and "ISIS" is a zero-sum conflict.

The transitional Ministry of Interior, headed by Anas Khattab, continues its security and military operations to dismantle the group's cells in the Badia (desert) and central regions.

In a strategic development in early 2026, as government forces advanced eastward to take over detention centers and prisons in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, and to avoid mass escape scenarios that could destabilize the fragile stability, the US military intervened directly. In coordination with the authorities in Damascus, US forces executed a large-scale transfer of thousands of high-risk "ISIS" members and commanders from prisons in northeastern Syria to secured detention facilities inside Iraqi territory.

This measure removed an imminent security burden from al-Sharaa's government, while reflecting a level of operational pragmatism between Damascus and US Central Command.

Integrating the "SDF" and Ending Separated Identity

On the domestic front, following sharp military clashes in early January 2026 around Aleppo and its eastern countryside—which displaced approximately 148,000 civilians—the two sides moved toward a settlement forced by facts on the ground:

On January 16, 2026: President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree recognizing Kurds as an "essential component of the Syrian people" and adopting Kurdish as a national language.

On January 30, 2026: Through indirect coordination sponsored by US envoy Tom Barrack, a comprehensive integration agreement was signed, ending the Autonomous Administration framework. The Ministry of Defense began integrating the brigades and units of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (including the Kurdish Women's Protection Units - YPJ) as full regular blocs within the structures of the Hasakah and Aleppo military divisions of the Syrian Army.

The Hejaz Railway: Bypassing Closed Maritime Passages

Diplomatically and economically, Damascus seeks to establish its regional position through cross-border infrastructure projects. On June 10, 2026, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding to revive the historic "Hejaz Railway." The project aims to connect Saudi Arabia by land via Jordan and Syria (passing through Damascus and Aleppo) to Turkey, and from there to Europe. This logistical corridor, presented by Ankara and Riyadh as an alternative to maritime routes disrupted by the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz and shipping tensions, grants Syrian geography a vital role as an economic link between the Gulf and Europe.

Trump's G7 Statements: An Attempt to Impose a "Proxy" Against the Resistance

Confirming this rising shift in Damascus's regional weight, US President Donald Trump’s statements at the G7 summit in France on June 16, 2026, clearly revealed the new American vision. Trump, expressing dissatisfaction with the pace of Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, openly called for leaving this task to Damascus.

"Israel has been fighting Hezbollah for a very long time, and many people are being killed... I suggested to Israel that they let Syria take care of Hezbollah. Because to be honest with you, I think they would do a better job at it."

US President Donald Trump, G7 Summit (June 16, 2026)

This American reading reveals a clear desire to exploit the experienced military capabilities of al-Sharaa's forces to besiege and contain the This proposition aligns with Damascus's recent security steps; on May 5, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced the dismantling of a network linked to Hezbollah in several governorates, noting that it was planning to target high-ranking government figures.

Ahmed al-Sharaa's leadership faces a genuine dilemma in managing contradictions. On one hand, it benefits from operational coordination with Washington to secure the east of the Euphrates and manage the file of extremist organization detainees, and relies on Turkish-Gulf logistical support to rebuild infrastructure through mega-projects like the Hejaz line. On the other hand, the US push to drag Damascus into a direct, open conflict with Hezbollah and the Axis components represents a real minefield.

The attempt to turn the new Syria into a functional tool to strike the depth of the resistance could rupture its fragile internal stability, especially in light of a suffocating economic crisis where 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, along with a severe funding deficit for humanitarian response plans.