In a scene that appears to reproduce familiar scenarios targeting the Resistance, the “Second Nabatieh Appeal” presents itself as a civic outcry. Yet, to those familiar with the dynamics of Lebanese politics, the threads of the game appear increasingly visible.
The Story from the Beginning
On May 29, 2026, a group of activists launched the first “Nabatieh Appeal,” warning that the war was reaching the city. The second appeal followed on September 7, 2026, signed by more than 400 people, after Israeli airstrikes on Nabatieh and its surrounding areas intensified, forcing some residents to flee.
The appeal carried a dramatic title:
“Save the Capital of Jabal Amel and Its Historic Metropolis!”
It called for the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the city, for the state to assume responsibility for its security, and for decisions of war and peace to be placed exclusively in the hands of its legitimate institutions.
How Did the Alleged Plot Take Shape?
What stands out is that, despite formally addressing the state and Israel, the appeal appears to focus overwhelmingly on one particular side.
More than three-quarters of its content, according to this reading, is devoted to holding Hezbollah responsible, portraying it as the primary cause of the destruction while overlooking the immediate aggressor: the Israeli occupation that is destroying, bombing and uprooting communities.
The timing is also significant. The appeal emerged when Hezbollah had been under severe pressure after years of war, while Israel was intensifying its military campaign against southern Lebanon.
Rather than presenting itself primarily as a call to unite against the enemy, the appeal can therefore be interpreted as a political blow against the Resistance under a humanitarian cover.
Who Signed It—and Who Was Behind It?
Media reports identified the signatories as a mixture of civil and political figures, including lawyer Ali Murad and activist Mirna Beshara, who spoke about an “announced loss” and growing exhaustion with the “victory narrative.”
The appeal also received political support from the Kataeb Party and MP Ashraf Rifi, both known for their opposition to Hezbollah.
The deeper issue, however, is whether this movement has a broader political agenda: who organized it, who financed it, and why was it launched at this particular moment?
Its timing coincided with domestic and external campaigns critical of the Resistance, while the Lebanese government remained largely absent from any effective effort to protect the South. This creates the perception that the suffering of civilians is being transformed into political pressure against Hezbollah.
The Lebanese Government: Spectator or Complicit?
Instead of becoming an active partner in protecting Nabatieh, the Lebanese government has limited itself to increasing Army patrols as a form of reassurance, while key areas such as the Ali al-Taher Hills remain outside effective Army control, allowing the occupation to consolidate its position there.
The Army is present, but it does not prevent the advance. The government issues statements, but fails to act decisively.
The result is a dangerous political equation in which the state appears ready to tell Hezbollah: “You are responsible, and we are here to replace you.”
The protection of southern Lebanon then risks becoming a matter of political bargaining rather than a constitutional responsibility.
What Do the Signatories Really Want?
According to this critical reading, the appeal seeks not only to save Nabatieh, but also to:
Strip the Resistance of its defensive legitimacy.
Promote the narrative that Hezbollah, rather than the Israeli occupation, is responsible for the destruction.
Push residents to turn against Hezbollah under the pressure of displacement and fear.
Encourage the state to establish itself as an alternative to the Resistance.
In other words: because Israel bombed and destroyed, the blame is placed on those who fought back—not on those who occupied.
The appeal offers no clear answer to the central security question: How would the Lebanese Army confront Israeli forces if they entered the city? Nor does it adequately address the state’s longstanding failure to provide effective protection for southern Lebanon.
Instead, the message is reduced to: “You are responsible.”
The “Second Nabatieh Appeal,” from this perspective, risks serving an Israeli objective of stripping the South of its Resistance, while simultaneously allowing the Lebanese government to evade responsibility for defending it.
And Nabatieh will remain under threat as long as its suffering is treated as a political bargaining chip rather than as the fate of a city that deserves protection—not merely through statements and petitions, but through a credible strategy capable of confronting the occupying force.