The “Second Nabatieh Appeal” calls for protecting Nabatieh, deploying the Lebanese Army and security forces, restoring the state’s role, and placing the decision of war and peace exclusively in the hands of official institutions. These are legitimate demands—especially when the South is facing Israeli aggression, destruction, occupation, and displacement.
But the problem begins with how responsibility is distributed.
After assigning Israel responsibility for the aggression, the appeal shifts toward holding the Resistance and its military decisions partly responsible for the situation in the South. By placing the “de facto forces and the enemy” within the same framework, it risks transforming a conflict with an occupying power into an internal Lebanese dispute over weapons and decision-making.
That distinction matters.
Israel is an occupying power, not another “de facto force.” It possesses overwhelming military superiority and makes its own political and military decisions. Occupation cannot simply be explained as the consequence of the existence of the Resistance or the absence of the state.
The same applies to the argument that Lebanon must “remove the enemy’s pretexts.” The burden cannot be shifted onto the occupied population to behave differently so that the aggressor will stop attacking. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated that its strategic objectives cannot be reduced to whatever justification it presents for a particular operation.
The appeal also raises the issue of the Ali al-Taher Hills as though transferring such positions to the Army would necessarily have prevented their occupation. That assumption ignores what happened to positions previously handed over to the Lebanese Army, where Israeli forces subsequently compelled the Army to withdraw and occupied and destroyed the area.
The fundamental question, therefore, is not simply “Why didn’t the Resistance hand over the land?” It is also “Why did Israel occupy it?”
Calling for the state to assume responsibility is legitimate. But sovereignty requires more than monopolizing the decision of war and peace. It requires political independence, military capability, deterrence, and the capacity to defend Lebanese territory.
Otherwise, “restoring the state” risks becoming a slogan for removing the Resistance’s ability to act without providing a credible alternative for confronting an occupying power.
The Resistance can—and should—be debated and held accountable for its choices. But its responsibility cannot be placed on the same scale as that of the occupying power.
Saving Nabatieh requires confronting the occupation, scrutinizing the political authority, and debating the Resistance—without confusing their fundamentally different responsibilities.
Otherwise, the debate quietly shifts from holding the occupier accountable to putting the Resistance on trial.