The Story of Imposing the Agreement and the President’s Written Pledges

Mehdi Khanalizadeh’s account of the hidden aspects of post-war negotiations (Final Part)

Following the justificatory letter from the Supreme National Security Council, Sayyid Mojtaba conveyed a reply that read: "

There is no good in these negotiations, neither for your worldly life nor for your hereafter. If the other side sees that conditions are favorable, they will strike Iran's infrastructure, and these negotiations will not stop them."

Bypassing the Leadership's Conditions and the Birth of the 14-Point Plan

Despite this, the Supreme National Security Council took a different path. The ten conditions were completely scrapped, and on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a new 14-point plan was drafted, which ultimately produced the

"Agreement to End the War."

The formula was based on the following logic: first, declare an end to the war, then enter into nuclear negotiations and make concessions to guarantee peace!

Two Weeks of Silence and the "Silence Implies Consent" Assumption

The National Security Council approved this agreement and sent it to the Leadership, but the text remained without a reply for about two weeks. At this point, the council members held a meeting and decided to treat this silence as consent and move forward with the plan! However, right in the middle of that meeting, a letter arrived from the Leader containing fundamental and decisive questions.

The President's Written Pledge and the Issuance of Permission

Under the pressure of time, the council members responded to the questions in writing and provided a pledge clarifying the interpretation of the agreement's clauses. For instance, they pledged in writing that the "non-interference" clause included the shutdown of certain hostile media outlets. This is the exact same pledge the Leader later referred to in his speech when he said:

"The President has given us a pledge."

Based on this written pledge, permission was issued to announce the agreement.

Conclusion: "Conceptually, I Had a Different Opinion"

This is the full trajectory that led to the Leadership's stance. The Leader was conceptually opposed to this entire path that followed the Islamabad round and did not believe in it. However, the agreement was ultimately pushed through under pressure and insistence from the Supreme National Security Council, leading to the outcome we are witnessing today.