“Gaza’s Shadow Armies: How Abu Shabab and Israel’s Mercenaries Became Predators in the Ruins”

Introduction When the bombs dim and the ceasefire is inked, few will write the names of the mercenary militias that emerged in Gaza’s ruins. But those shadow forces — led by Abu Shabab and organized around local clans and private contractors — left scars deeper than shattered buildings. They fought Hamas, looted aid, tortured Palestinians, and enriched themselves on the suffering. Behind the spectacle of war, they became spoilers of any peace. This article goes deep, citing direct testimony and documents, to trace who they are, how they operated, and what might become of them in the fragile postwar order.   Origins: From Clan Networks to Armed Factions Abu Shabab — the Bedouin Smuggler Turned Militia Leader Yasser “Abu Shabab” is perhaps the most visible face of Gaza’s insurgent internecine warfare. He hails from the Bedouin communities around Rafah and is said to have roots in smuggling, clan patronage, and the local network of tunnels that long linked Gaza, Egypt, and Sinai. Over the course of 2024, as Hamas was weakened by Israeli operations, Abu Shabab’s group recruited fighters by offering salaries and presenting itself as a “restorative” force against Hamas’ brutality (Aawsat).¹ Abu Shabab denies direct collaboration with the Israeli army, yet multiple reports allege that his forces operate in areas under Israeli control, carrying out tasks that align with Israel’s tactical interests.² His militia is often called the Popular Forces or Fuerzas Populares in some Spanish-language media, estimated to number a few hundred fighters inside eastern Rafah and adjacent zones (Fuerzas Populares wiki).³ The Clan Militias and Criminal Networks Behind Abu Shabab stand families and clans long embedded in Gaza’s social structure. Among the most powerful:

• Doghmush clan — one of Gaza’s most notorious and heavily armed families. Its networks have been affiliated variably with Fatah, Hamas, Islamist groups and criminal enterprises over time.⁴

• Al-Majayda (Astal/Majayda) — in Khan Younis, known for smuggling influence and local muscle.

• Hilles (aka Helles / Khalas) — historically aligned with Fatah, with recruiting and neighborhood influence in Gaza City and Shuja‘iyya.⁵

• Various collaborator cells and informant networks scattered across Gaza, often overlapping with these clans. These clans had experience in arms, checkpoints, criminal trade and smuggling long before the war. What changed is that the intensity of war gave them space to expand into semi-state security actors.   Funding, Arms & Alleged Sponsorship Self-financing Through Chaos One of the more verifiable sources of funding was the diversion and theft of humanitarian aid, fuel, medical supplies and food convoys. In a shattered environment with minimal policing, armed groups could intercept trucks or checkpoints and extract value. Aid workers and local civilians repeatedly testified to this phenomenon. A World Central Kitchen employee said: “When the supplies arrive, they try to steal.”⁶ Those revenues allowed these groups to pay fighters, buy weapons on the black market, and maintain logistics. Accusations of Israeli Arms, Support and Toleration Investigative media and humanitarian analysts claim that Israel, while publicly denying involvement, has in some zones allowed — and in certain cases enabled — the operations of these militias as local proxies. For instance:

• Under the argument that “aid must be secured better,” Israel supported the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), a private entity that used for-profit security firms in aid logistics. Critics say that-control over aid channels gave leverage to armed actors.⁷

• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly defended arming anti-Hamas Palestinian clans, including what reporters called Abu Shabab’s group, as a way to reduce Israeli casualties.⁸

• Some armed groups allegedly received radios, communications gear and protection for movements in areas where the IDF still held dominance.

However, the Israeli government has formally denied systematic support for mercenary forces, and no publicly confirmed official record has emerged of large arms shipments under state sanction. The real relationship is opaque and likely clandestine. The USAID Internal Report: Casting Doubt on the “Hamas stole all the aid” Narrative In July 2025, Reuters published findings of an internal U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) analysis. In 156 reported incidents of lost or stolen U.S.-funded aid supplies (between October 2023 and May 2025), “no reports alleging Hamas benefited”were found (Reuters).⁹ The report noted that at least 44 of those incidents were “either directly or indirectly” caused by Israeli military operations, and the majority could not be reliably attributed to any actor (Reuters).¹⁰ This matters greatly: the claim that “Hamas steals all the aid” has been one of the key justifications used to legitimize militarized aid channels and proxy groups. The USAID study complicates the narrative by emphasizing that some diversion may stem from armed predators in the aid chain itself or from conflict conditions induced by Israeli actions.   Wartime Role: Aid Theft, Fighting Hamas, Price Graft & Torture Controlling Aid Routes & Checkpoints Abu Shabab’s men and allied clan militias occupied key junctions and border-adjacent corridors, demanding “security fees” or authority to examine and reroute convoys. Their presence at crossings and along main supply lines allowed them to intercept, delay or siphon shipments. Humanitarian organizations repeatedly warned that the mere presence of armed actors near aid routes increases the risk of diversion.   Looting & Diversion of Aid Multiple reports (including from U.N. and NGOs) document cases in which trucks were looted, supplies were taken to local warehouses, and food and medicine redistributed via armed intermediaries. Some trucks never reached their intended recipients. Investigative journalists have tied certain high-volume thefts to powerful clans allied with Abu Shabab. The United Nations has described some of these acts as “systematic looting.”¹¹ Fighting Hamas & Rival Clashes These militias did not merely opportunistically loot. In contested zones they clashed with Hamas fighters, arrested suspected Hamas operatives, and attempted to carve out zones of influence. In certain sectors where Israel withdrew or held partial control, local militias acted as auxiliary security forces. The internal split led to violent confrontations: for example, after the ceasefire Hamas forces killed 32 members of a “gang” in Gaza City in a crackdown on armed groups seen as destabilizing rivals (Reuters).¹² Hamas claimed the gang was not part of Abu Shabab’s network, but such operations reflect the internal power struggle.¹³ Extortion, Price Inflation & Black Market Control By controlling chokepoints of fuel, food and medicine, armed groups could impose steep markups and gatekeeping fees — further impoverishing an already desperate population. The smaller the supply, the higher the desperation, and the greater the leverage of whoever controlled the channel. Torture, Detention, Killings Credible local testimonies and humanitarian sources accuse Abu Shabab’s forces and allied groups of arbitrary arrests, beatings and torture — especially of those suspected of collaborating with Hamas or resisting their rule. In contested neighborhoods, locals speak of night raids, secret detention sites, and interrogations overseen by militias.¹⁴ Perhaps more damning is the fact that when Hamas regained contested areas, it too carried out public executions and reprisals against alleged collaborators (among them members of these militias). But that does not exonerate the militia abuses; rather, it reveals how brutal and personalized this war became inside Gaza.   Weapons & Firepower These militias relied mostly on small arms and light weapons:

• Assault rifles (AK derivatives, automatic rifles)

• Machine guns and PK-type general-purpose machine guns

RPGs and anti-tank launchers mounted on pickup trucks (“technical” style)

• Light mortars and grenade launchers

• Communications gear, radios, and improvised armor in some cases They generally did not field large-scale artillery or heavy armored vehicles like tanks, which remain in the domain of state militaries. Still, their arsenal was enough to contest control of neighborhoods and hold checkpoints against diminished or dispersed Hamas cadres. There are multiple allegations of Israeli tolerance — and even indirect supply — of heavier gear to these groups. But definitive, publicly verified records of direct Israeli arms provision are sparse. The ambiguity is part of the strategy.   Post-Ceasefire Prospects: Integration, Expulsion, or Extermination? Hamas Retribution and Reassertion From the very first hours of the ceasefire, Hamas security forces launched operations to kill or neutralize rival militias. Authorities report killing 32 members of a “gang” in Gaza City as part of their push to reestablish order (Reuters).¹² The regime is showing it intends to forcibly eliminate those it considers traitors or spoilers.¹³ Hamas has also reportedly targeted senior associates of Abu Shabab: one senior aide was “liquidated” during the post-ceasefire campaign, and the hunt for Abu Shabab continues (Reuters).¹² Integration or Controlled Disarmament Some militia members may seek or be offered integration into reconstituted security forces — police roles, local enforcement jobs or shadowing Hamas structures — but this depends heavily on political bargains, accountability mechanisms, and the balance of power. Some lower-level fighters might be offered leniency in exchange for disarmament. Flight, Refuge or Asylum One open question is whether Abu Shabab and his forces will be allowed to flee into Israel or to Israeli-controlled zones. Some collaborated elements may try to seek refuge, bargaining their utility to Israeli intelligence or military planners. But granting them sanctuary is politically toxic. Local reporting suggests some factions have already retreated eastward alongside withdrawing Israeli forces.¹⁵ It is unlikely – though not impossible – that the militias will remain intact and unassailable inside Gaza. Their staying power depends on external backing, local alliances, and Israel’s continued tolerance. The Danger of Frozen Militias If neither full purge nor integration takes place, these militias might ossify into perpetual spoilers — controlling black markets, imposing predatory taxes and undermining institutions. A fragile reconstruction process under such shadow power brokers would struggle to build legitimacy or stable governance.   Conclusion

In the rubble and terror of Gaza’s war, Abu Shabab and his network of mercenaries stand as a dark mirror: not merely as opponents of Hamas, but as scavengers of chaos. They fought, looted, tortured, and graded their profits on the suffering of civilians. The alliances that tolerated and perhaps enabled them — whether local, regional or even Israeli — will bear a heavy historical burden. The post-ceasefire period is a dangerous turning point. If Hamas fails to decisively dismantle these militias, or if Israel continues to shield them, the next Gaza may not be one rebuilt from scratch but one ruled by a new class of warlords. In a land already emptied of stability, the shadows may outlast the ceasefire.