Trump made the remarks yesterday, Thursday, November 12, 2026, during a phone interview with right-wing radio host Hugh Hewitt on Salem News Channel’s The Hugh Hewitt Show.
During the interview, Hewitt directly asked Trump whether he would authorize the use of
“a limited amount of military force, in a campaign lasting one week”
against the island.
Trump replied:
“Yes, I would be willing, and I would certainly consider that.”
He added:
“I want to get Cuba done before I leave office.”
According to Politico, this marks the first time Trump has explicitly linked the prospect of imposing regime change in Havana to a specific timeline. (CNBC, Politico, Al Jazeera, November 12–13, 2026).
What Does Trump Actually Mean?
1. Regime change within a fixed deadline, not merely slogans about liberation.
Trump’s presidential term ends in January 2029. On October 31, he had already declared that
“no member of the Castro family will remain in power when I leave office.”
Therefore, the phrase “get Cuba done” is not simply political rhetoric. It is a clear expression of a regime-change project with a defined deadline, following the same approach he attempted to apply to Iran. (CNBC, Cuba Headlines).
2. A “one-week military campaign” means military coercion, not a full-scale invasion.
A realistic assessment suggests that a large-scale ground invasion of an island with approximately 10 million inhabitants, located roughly 110 miles from Miami, could not be completed in just one week.
The scenario more consistent with Trump’s wording would be a short, intense military campaign involving:
▪️ A naval blockade and maritime interdiction, preventing ships from reaching Cuba. In October, Trump had already floated the idea of deploying American warships just 50 yards off the Cuban coast.
▪️ Targeted military strikes against facilities and installations associated with the Cuban government.
▪️ The strangulation of energy and fuel supplies, designed to exhaust Havana economically and break its political resolve.
The objective would be to force Cuba’s leadership to relinquish power and transfer authority to a successor government.
In this context, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose family emigrated from Cuba, was identified as someone who
“would love to do it”
— effectively positioning him as the potential political face of such an operation. (The Independent, November 12, 2026).
3. Domestic political calculations disguised as foreign policy.
Trump has cited his claim that he won “94% of the Cuban vote” in Florida — a figure unsupported by any reliable exit polling.
He presents potential action against Havana as a gift to Cuban Americans who
“came to the United States and were treated very badly.”
Cuban exile lobbying groups in Miami remain among the most consistently supportive electoral constituencies of the American right.
From this perspective, achieving a “decisive victory” against Cuba could offer Trump one of the least politically costly victories following the midterm elections. (Cuba Headlines, NBC News, November 13, 2026).
4. The real instrument of pressure is economic — and it is already exhausting the island.
Since March, Washington has conducted an intensive economic sanctions campaign, involving more than twenty rounds of measures imposed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
These measures have targeted more than 40 entities and 38 individuals linked to Cuba’s military-economic complex, in addition to a new sanctions package announced on November 5 that included the blocking of five vessels. (Cuba Headlines).
The consequences have been severe:
▪️ In May, Cuba’s Ministry of Energy acknowledged that the country had exhausted its supplies of fuel oil and diesel.
▪️ Throughout the spring, Cuba experienced repeated nationwide electrical grid collapses.
▪️ The Cuban Embassy in Washington estimated that the economic damage caused by the blockade amounted to approximately $8 billion between March 2025 and February 2026. (CNBC, The Guardian).
This is why Cuba’s Foreign Ministry describes Washington’s policy as “collective punishment.”
The economic blockade is now being used to accomplish what American military force has failed to achieve since 1961: breaking the Cuban government’s ability to withstand US pressure.
Why Does Cuba Still Matter Strategically?
First: Geographic Location
Cuba is located approximately 90–110 miles from the US mainland.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 erupted because the island’s geographic position made it possible to directly threaten American territory.
Similarly, the deployment of a military force hostile to Washington on Cuban soil could threaten the US Eastern Seaboard and the Caribbean region.
Therefore, controlling the maritime approaches to Florida, the Straits of Florida, and the Caribbean represents a fundamental American maritime interest, directly reflecting the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, which treats the Western Hemisphere as a sphere of US influence.
Second: The Last Communist Regime in the Western Hemisphere
Overthrowing the government in Havana would symbolically complete Washington’s project of bringing the Western Hemisphere back under its dominance — what could be described as Trump’s vision of “One Big, Beautiful Western Hemisphere.”
Venezuela is already experiencing turmoil under a similar pressure campaign.
Meanwhile, successfully “dealing with” Cuba would send a political message that no left-wing government in the region can withstand American pressure.
Third: Cuba’s Strategic Value Within the Anti-US Hegemony Axis
Cuba represents the oldest stronghold of resistance to Western imperialism in the Western Hemisphere.
For more than six decades, Havana has maintained its opposition to American hegemony despite blockades, sanctions, and sustained political and economic pressure.
Its strategic significance is reflected in several areas:
▪️ Medical diplomacy: Cuba has dispatched tens of thousands of doctors and healthcare professionals to developing countries, particularly across the Global South.
▪️ Political positions: Its support for the Palestinian cause, continued solidarity with Iran, and backing for movements and countries opposed to American hegemony.
▪️ Strategic connections: Cuba serves as a political bridge between resistance movements in the Middle East and liberation movements and left-wing organizations throughout Latin America.
Despite the island’s relatively small size, with a population of approximately 10 million and an economy that has contracted to a level far below that of many individual US states, its political and symbolic influence extends well beyond its actual economic and demographic weight.
Cuba represents a source of legitimacy and a symbol of resilience for significant segments of the Global South, while remaining a persistent challenge to American influence.
This is precisely why Cuba has been on Trump’s list of targets since March, when he first spoke about a “friendly takeover” of the island and the “honor of taking Cuba.” (CNBC, November 13, 2026).
Fourth: A Realistic Military Assessment
Military analysts remain skeptical about the possibility of a full-scale American invasion of Cuba.
One week of military operations might be sufficient to deliver a major military and economic shock, but it would certainly not be enough to occupy and administer the island.
For this reason, the more likely scenario appears to be escalating economic and maritime pressure to the maximum possible extent until the Cuban government begins to fracture internally.
The progression of Trump’s statements reveals a clear escalation pattern:
▪️ September: Ruling out the use of military force.
▪️ October: Threatening to deploy warships off the Cuban coast.
▪️ November 12: Expressing willingness to consider a week-long military campaign.
This sequence resembles a conventional escalation ladder leading toward a political or military decision, rather than a series of isolated statements made without context. (Cuba Headlines).
Latest Developments as of November 13, 2026
Cuba’s Position: Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations, Ernesto Soberón Guzmás, condemned the American statements. Meanwhile, the Cuban military leadership acknowledged the imbalance of military power but began mobilizing and preparing, treating the threat as serious.
US Sanctions: The US State Department’s November 5 sanctions package targeted eight entities and two individuals, in addition to blocking five vessels. This was followed by further Treasury Department measures on November 11 targeting Cuban oil tankers and the maritime sector.
Washington’s Conditions: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio made any potential agreement with Havana conditional on the Cuban government abandoning its “current path.”
The US Political Situation: Democrats won the November 3 midterm elections, but they will not assume control of Congress until January 3, 2027.
This means Trump has approximately two months of broad executive freedom without direct legislative oversight from the incoming congressional majority, particularly after withdrawing Vice President JD Vance from negotiations concerning Iran. (The Independent, November 12, 2026).

