Parisa Nasrabadi
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed claimed, citing sources involved in the Qatari mediation efforts, that indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington had made progress and that a US delegation would join the Iranian delegation in Doha for talks, paving the way for an announcement that both sides were returning to the negotiating track.
This reportedly followed an agreement on preliminary measures concerning Iran’s nuclear program, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and financial incentives for Iran, with guarantees from China and Russia.
It was also reported that JD Vance’s letter to Mohsen Rezaei, according to media outlets close to the White House, emphasized that any US–Iranian negotiations must include discussions of the nuclear issue.
Given these developments, Iran must reject the Qatari proposal in its current form, because its foundation rests on granting irreversible nuclear concessions and allowing sensitive access to facilities and highly sensitive security-related data in exchange for limited promises that the other side can easily reverse.
Otherwise, Iran would effectively be heading toward repeating a grave strategic mistake it previously made in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.
The difference is that implementation of that memorandum never reached the point where Iran had actually granted the other side an irreversible concession. Today, however, preparations for a military attack against Iran are entering their final operational stages.
The reality is that the Qatari and Pakistani mediators, acting on behalf of the American side, are still using the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding as their starting point, but beginning with its middle provisions without respecting the original sequence of its clauses.
For reference, Clause Eight of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding states:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it will neither produce nor acquire a nuclear weapon.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America have agreed to resolve the status of stored enriched nuclear material through a mutually agreed mechanism, according to the timetable set out in Clause Seven, including, at a minimum, on-site downblending under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Both parties also agree to discuss enrichment and other mutually agreed issues relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework to be agreed upon in the final agreement.
The final agreement shall reaffirm the provisions of this clause.”
Beyond the fact that this entire clause was included and accepted by the Iranian side contrary to the Iranian Supreme Leader’s clearly stated wishes and recommendations regarding the memorandum, its substance is also deeply problematic and was formulated in a manner that contradicts Iran’s national interests.
Among the problematic elements is the inclusion of “non-acquisition” alongside “non-production of a nuclear weapon” — a formulation that had not previously been presented with such explicitness and in this particular combination in Iranian political documents or agreements.
It also implicitly repeats an obligation already imposed on Iran under an international treaty — Article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — within a bilateral document with the United States, thereby granting Washington a special legal privilege to exercise direct oversight and demand compliance with that commitment.
Another problem is the inclusion of details such as “on-site downblending of uranium stockpiles” as a minimum measure Iran must undertake.
This effectively transforms Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles from a potential bargaining chip into an already accepted minimum concession.
Consequently, subsequent negotiations would begin from that same position, despite Trump’s claim that the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding had expired and was no longer relevant.
The excessive focus on “designing a possible agreement” within an illusory framework of “confidence-building”, while neglecting the fundamental question — “Could the proposed process itself make Iran more vulnerable before any distant final agreement is reached?” — means abandoning the priority of Iran’s national interests and security.
From a strategic perspective, Iran’s primary objective at this moment cannot be to balance Tehran’s interests against Washington’s within an imposed framework of “coercive diplomacy” that requires Iran to surrender leverage that would be extremely difficult to recover.
Rather, Iran’s vital and strategic objectives are to preserve its territorial integrity, protect the lives of every Iranian — from the Supreme Leader and senior officials to ordinary citizens — safeguard its defensive capabilities, maintain its independence in decision-making, and preserve its economic strength.
Iran can only view the negotiating table as preparation for the next phase of war.
The experience of two wars within a single year, both occurring amid intensive negotiations and diplomatic activity, provides the strongest evidence that Iran must not accept “beginning negotiations with the inclusion of nuclear issues” or “granting strategic nuclear and security concessions” in exchange for a promise to “prevent another military attack.”
Instead, given the serious possibility of another war, Iran must maintain its military and security focus and readiness at the highest levels while protecting its strategic assets and capabilities.
Jordan Clashes with 14 Armed Men Crossing from Syria — a Smuggling Network or a Terrorist Cell Linked to the Church Massacre?
Jordan–Syria Border
The Jordanian Armed Forces announced through the official Petra News Agency that border guards clashed on Friday evening with a group of approximately 14 armed men attempting to cross from Syrian territory under heavy covering fire.
According to the military statement, the confrontation inflicted several casualties on the group, while the surviving members fled back into Syrian territory.
However, the army did not disclose the gunmen’s identities, nationalities, or organizational affiliations.
The More Troubling Connection: the Hammoud Church Massacre
On October 23, 9 people were killed and 34 others wounded in an armed attack targeting a funeral at St. George’s Church in Jordan’s Karak Governorate.
Jordanian authorities announced the arrest of three suspects, all Jordanian nationals, describing them as adherents of extremist takfiri ideology.
On October 26, the Jordanian Air Force launched Operation “Jordanian Deterrence – Hammoud” against positions in southern Syria that the military claimed belonged to terrorist groups linked to the perpetrators of the massacre.
According to the Associated Press, Damascus reported that seven civilians were killed in the strikes, while Amman maintained that it had targeted ISIS militants and acknowledged civilian casualties.
This raises a critical question: Was the latest infiltration attempt connected to these networks, or was it retaliation for Jordan’s airstrikes?
So far, the Jordanian military has presented no evidence linking the armed group to the church massacre.
Military and Geopolitical Assessment
Historically, the Jordan–Syria border has witnessed weapons and drug smuggling operations, as well as armed confrontations involving organized groups.
However, the latest developments are particularly concerning because they coincide with a terrorist attack inside Jordan and subsequent Jordanian airstrikes on Syrian territory.
Is Jordan beginning to face the spillover effects of Syria’s armed instability, despite the growing political and security rapprochement between Amman and Damascus?