Withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Forces Bill under U.S

On August 27–28, 2025, the Iraqi government withdrew the draft law regulating the “Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)” from Parliament after weeks of political wrangling. Lawmakers and officials confirmed that the decision came under “external pressure,” specifically from Washington, with reports of warnings and threats of sanctions should the bill be passed in its proposed form. This was reported by various sources, including al-Araby al-Jadeed, The National, Shafaq News, summary reports through ReliefWeb, as well as Rudaw and Amwaj.Media, which linked the development to broader regional tensions and a U.S. redeployment in northern Iraq.

This step is neither technical nor procedural; it is thoroughly political. It has direct implications for Iraq’s internal deterrence balance and its regional equation at a time of instability and the looming risk of wider wars.

Why Should We Reject the Withdrawal of the Bill Now?

1⃣ Because the PMF has been part of the state since 2016 The PMF has been legally recognized within the military establishment by a previous legislative act (Law No. 40/2016). Any new law aimed to regulate service, salaries, pensions, and administrative structures to fill the “gaps” in that brief legislation. Withdrawing the draft leaves those gaps in place and weakens the state’s ability to hold the forces accountable and integrate them institutionally. Even research centers critical of the PMF acknowledge that the 2016 law is overly concise and requires complementary regulation.

2⃣ Because withdrawal under foreign pressure undermines sovereignty and decision-making The explicit and implicit acknowledgment of U.S. pressure to scrap the bill essentially internationalizes Iraq’s security legislation. Today it is the PMF bill; tomorrow it may be any matter related to the defense system. A state whose laws are dictated from overseas loses the confidence of both its public and its security forces. This reality is reflected in the statements of MPs who openly spoke of “international pressures” to block the bill.

3⃣ Because security cannot afford a vacuum: the PMF is a safety valve against ISIS and al-Qaeda UN and international reports—issued even this month—warn that the threat of ISIS has not disappeared, and that it exploits any security gaps in Syria and Iraq to reorganize its cells. Any shake-up in the PMF’s legal framework, or any signals of institutional marginalization, grants extremists a window of return and undermines deployment in Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Hamrin—areas the PMF knows intimately in terms of terrain and insurgent networks.

4⃣ Because institutional organization—not exclusion—is the path to discipline This month saw strict decisions to dismiss brigade commanders and refer offenders to court after a deadly clash in Baghdad. The incident confirmed that the solution lies in reinforcing the chain of command and legal accountability within an organized framework—not by freezing the legal framework itself. Strengthening the law makes it easier to hold any faction accountable for violations, while withdrawal blurs standards and fuels duality.

What Does Washington Want from Scrapping the Bill? Curtailing the influence of “resistance” forces and reducing the PMF’s budget and administrative power. U.S. analyses openly argue that any enhancement of the PMF’s status within the state structure expands the margin of pro-Tehran forces, and therefore Washington prefers to keep the legal framework weak and suspended.

Maintaining leverage over Baghdad in negotiations on U.S. troop presence. Linking the PMF issue to the broader track of bases and security cooperation, regional reports tied the withdrawal to U.S. troop repositioning in Kurdistan and wider talks on rules of engagement.

by proxy inside Iraq The weaker the institutional integration of the PMF, the more fragmented it becomes and the easier it is to exploit in the regional tug-of-war—keeping Baghdad in a perpetually defensive position.

From an Iraqi national perspective, these objectives do not serve domestic stability. Instead, they turn Iraq into an arena for pressure and bargaining rather than a stable state with independent sovereign decision-making.

The Government’s “Compliance”: Political and Security Costs

Yielding to external pressure through a swift withdrawal will go down as a “precedent.” It sends a negative message to PMF personnel—hundreds of thousands of fighters and employees—that their service rights, pensions, and salaries are merely “bargaining chips.” It also conveys to large social constituencies that their sacrifices in the war against ISIS are being politically manipulated against them. Domestically, this opens the door to tensions within the regular security forces, undermines public confidence in security reform, and complicates any future restructuring on a basis of consent and commitment.

Immediate security risks: The expansion of “grey zones” exploited by sleeper cells, and a decline in joint responses (army/police/PMF) in remote areas. UN and media levels recently warned of attempts to reactivate cells in Syria and Iraq.

Uncalculated regional tension: In a scenario of regional escalation where Israel launches a major strike against Iran, Iraq would objectively be at the heart of deterrence calculations. A PMF institution legally regulated and tied to a government command chain could calibrate responses and prevent uncontrolled escalation. A marginalized PMF outside a solid legislative framework exposes Iraq to disarray and improvisation—either through involuntary entanglement or through inability to mount balanced defense.

Deepening division between Baghdad, the Kurdistan region, and political forces: Keeping the issue unresolved doubles partisan and regional polarization, and affects field coordination in Nineveh, Kirkuk, and the Syrian border—where the interests of the international coalition, Kurdish forces, federal forces, and the PMF intersect. Several reports linked the withdrawal to broader frictions over foreign troop deployment.

Shifting from “security economy” to “crisis economy”: Without a clear law on service and pensions, exceptions proliferate, rights are obstructed, and clientelism is recycled—instead of building a professional institution that is rewarded and held accountable under the law.

What Is To Be Done? Practical Recommendations to Protect Iraq Resubmit an improved draft swiftly: Broaden consultations on service, pensions, and organizational structure rather than deferring the file to another parliamentary cycle.

Shield the negotiation track with Washington: Anchor the formula “strict institutional integration in return for balanced security cooperation,” not “scrapping legislation for vague promises.”

Prevent duality: Any faction that breaches the chain of command must be held accountable under clear legal provisions—this requires an active law applied to all. The recent dismissals are proof that the state can act if it possesses the necessary tools.

Conclusion

Withdrawing the PMF bill, in its current form and under external pressure, harms Iraq more than it benefits. It undermines the institutionalization of one of the most important tools of deterrence against terrorism, shakes legislative sovereignty, and increases the country’s fragility at a time of heightened regional danger. The responsible national stance is not “ideological entrenchment,” but to quickly complete the PMF’s legal framework within the state structure—ensuring discipline, accountability, and protection for Iraq from vacuums and external interference. 🔵